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but it accomplished a further purpose, which is of special interest to the world at this time, in expressing Japan's earnest desire to co-operate with this country in waging war against the German Government. The discussion, which covered the military, naval, and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, showed the same spirit of sincerity and candor which characterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange of notes.

"At the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of these conversations, but it may be said that this Government has been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their Government desired to do their part in the suppression of Prussian militarism and were eager to co-operate in every practical way to that end. It might be added, however, that complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of naval co-operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her allies have been reached between the representative of the Imperial Japanese navy, who is attached to the special mission of Japan, and the representative of the United States Navy.

"It is only just to say that the success which has attended the intercourse of the Japanese commission with American officials, and with private persons as well, is due in large measure to the personality of Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in negotiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness won the confidence and good will of all. It is doubtful if a representative of a different temper could in so short a time have done as much as Viscount Ishii to place on a better and firmer basis the relations between the United States and Japan. Through him the American people have gained a new and higher conception of the reality of Japan's friendship for the United States which will be mutually beneficial in the future."

A PRACTICAL "LIMITATION" OF ARMAMENTS

By P. R. DUVARNET

AS THE STRUCTURE of future world organization comes to be more intimately discussed, the question of a limitation of armaments rises more clearly in the foreground. After the war, because of its cost, if for no other reason, we can no more safely return to the era of competing armaments than we can to the *status quo* of the balance of power. We shall be faced definitely with the problem of some equitable and adequate regulation of armaments, which obviously will mean for the greater nations an appreciable diminution of military and naval defense, or which, in its extreme form, would be a decree for total disarmament by all the nations.

Mr. Gustav Spiller, of England, endeavored to prove some time ago, in the columns of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*, that, whereas limitation of armaments is impracticable, total disarmament is eminently practicable. It

may be said that while his proof was based solidly on its premises, it was essentially no more than a proof of theory. It may be proved conclusively that it is more practicable for me to wear green and red headlights in my hat when I go forth at night than to risk being run over; but when that is proved, my safety is no more assured thereby, for there is not the slightest likelihood that I shall take this means of self-protection. In like manner, the statement that total disarmament is more practicable than limitation of armaments is but an idle speculation, for there is little likelihood that the nations of the earth will at this time agree to so revolutionary a measure. If we are to consider probabilities rather than ultimate possibilities, we must concentrate our attention upon a less radical procedure and one more in accord with the so far expressed inclinations of the nations. We must suppose, therefore, that some partial limitation of arms will be tried out at the end of the war. Our privilege is to consider what form this may take.

It may be said at the start that limitation of armaments, to be in any way feasible, must operate upon the basis of some machinery of arbitration and conciliation; unless we are to assume, which we have no right to assume, that limitation arbitrarily imposed will be observed scrupulously by all the nations forever afterwards. It may be safely said that at least an attempt will be made to exceed any limitation. If we shall not be able to depend upon arbitration or conciliation to handle the situation so brought about, we shall, of course, soon be forced to regard such limitation as utterly valueless. Assuming, then, some international machinery of justice, the question is to decide what form of limitation may best be imposed.

The most obvious form is some such arbitrary measure as a limitation based upon the population of a country, or upon its size, or proportionate to its former expenditures for defense. None of these is wholly serviceable. None is a reliable criterion of that nation's need for defense. Other criteria, such as commerce, extent of colonial possessions, national wealth, and so on, are equally untrustworthy, partly because they do not represent adequately the nation's need of defense and partly because conditions between the nations after the war will not be relatively the same as were pre-war conditions, and the new conditions will be difficult to estimate.

The most favorable criteria are geographical position and the character of foreign possessions or dependencies, but upon these no estimate can be based by mere arithmetic. If any joint high commission were to attempt to decide arbitrarily from these criteria the just and effective limitation of armaments necessary for each several nation, it might well meet in continuous session till doomsday before the matter would be equitably settled. Indeed, any attempt to decide thus *a priori* a just limit of arms for each nation would result in discord and dissatisfaction, which would only increase as time tended to reveal more and more the assumed or actual injustice of such a decision.

As the matter is considered more closely, it becomes increasingly evident that each nation must decide for itself, and not have decided for it, what dangers it runs and what manner of defense it must maintain against these dangers. Thus the question very naturally shifts from one of an international superimposed "limitation"

of armaments to one of *individual national armament policy*.

There is, however, one additional assumption necessary in order to make such a self-limitation or limitation as a national policy feasible. This is that, at the Conference of Nations to follow the making of peace, it will be possible to ask from each heavily-armed nation and from every nation capable singly or by alliance of disturbing the peace of the world, a definitive statement of the purposes for which and the extent to which its army and navy and fortifications are to be maintained. It is assumed, that is, that nations will be able to place on record their several armament policies, showing with some degree of accuracy the nature and extent of the armament which each nation believes indispensable for its safety. When this has been done, a limit has been set which is in no true sense arbitrary and which should beyond dispute be satisfactory to the country so limited. It is then to be assumed, as we have already assumed, that it may be possible for the nations to agree that when any nation's armament or policy of armament does not accord with the definitively stated purpose of such armament, that condition becomes immediately a matter of concern to all the other nations parties to the standing international agreement.

While analogies are for the most part dangerous to the thoughtful consideration of any topic, one may be here employed solely for the purpose of making clear these two points: John Jones, representing in his person one of the greater nations of the earth, will be expected to say exactly why he carries two revolvers and a bowie-knife. In effect, he will make a formal declaration of the dangers he faces in his daily and nightly wanderings, and to explain satisfactorily why *two* revolvers are necessary and why he cannot rely upon the bowie-knife alone. It is supposed that John Jones is an honorable person and not a sneak-thief. It is supposed that he has a better reason than an abject fear of the unknowable to account for his weapons of defense. When John Jones has made his declaration, therefore, and if he does not later present an amendment specifying further dangers incurred necessitating heavier armament, it is to be supposed that any further purchase on his part of revolvers or bowie-knives, shot-guns or infernal machines constitutes a menace to the whole neighborhood.

The analogy, of course, cannot be carried farther. We know John Jones better than we know any one nation, and there are means of forestalling any homicidal mania with which he may be taken that do not obtain between nations. The point is that if, say, Germany feels that its position in the center of Europe is a hazardous one, and that it therefore must be more heavily armed than its neighbors, it need not be afraid to say so. If any nations of the earth enter into an international agreement for the preservation of peace, as is fervently to be hoped, either it is a sincere effort or it is insincere. If it is the latter, there is no use discussing it or the terms of it. There can be one end to it and only one, whatever treaties, agreements, or understandings may be entered into, and in despite of all the international courts, legislatures, boards of arbitration or conciliation that may be erected. If it is sincere, however, it is to be presumed that the parties to it will be capable of stating sincerely what their purposes are. Thus nations not

wishing to scrap their armaments will naturally be expected to state for what purposes they will be retained. Having made such a declaration, this declaration is in itself a definite statement of the reasons for such armament. Upon the basis of such a statement all subsequent activities in the armament line by this particular nation may be judged, as to whether they are or are not a menace to the nation's neighbors and so to the whole world.

To take a specific case, suppose that Russia has declared it necessary, for specified reasons, to fortify certain frontiers and to maintain a mobilized army of a certain size. This declaration has been made presumably in good faith and has been endorsed by the other Powers. Suppose that the annual military appropriations are doubled in any one year, or it be discovered that instead of building fortifications on any given frontier, as Russia declared she would do, she is instead engaged in drilling a tremendous field army, or, after stating the size of army she needs—so many trained men in service and reserve—she inaugurates a system of military service which, while keeping her standing army normal in size, actually gives her many hundreds of thousands more men technically termed "reserves," but in effect active soldiers. Observing such action, in operation or in prospect, Germany determines this to be a menace. Under the ancient system, Germany's only recourse would be competing armaments or armies. Under the terms of the international agreement, however, she is able to present a complaint before an intelligent body representative of many other nations which would be intimately or ultimately affected by Russia's act. Her complaint is not that Russia has overstepped any arbitrary limit, but that, *in her opinion*, Russia's present activities constitute a menace to world peace and a violation of her previous declaration of armament policy. This is obviously a question neither for Russia nor German opinion to decide alone. Such one-sided decisions are simply the first steps toward war. It is a matter for the world to decide, and it does not matter to the world so much what the size of Russia's armaments is as what she intends to do with them. It is for the world to decide whether Russia's armaments are justified by Russia's expressed purposes or whether they are not. And in the event of a decision that they are not justified, the world has in effect decided that Russia, at an early stage of a possible intended breach of world peace, is not in accord with the society of nations. Such a decision, given while Russia is as yet obviously not sufficiently prepared for a world war, would go far toward cooling the heated blood of would-be world conquerors. Were Russia to persist in her plan of armament, it would mean that the unified opinion of the rest of the world would be awake against her. She would find it more and more impossible to break up that unity to her advantage. She would have the onerous task of trying to bring war upon a world fully conscious of her endeavor and in condemnatory mood, watching her preparations with cold-eyed calculation.

Russia or any other nation, once its policies were stated definitively and accepted by the world, would find war at the drop of the hat practically impossible. Germany could wage the present war at the drop of the hat simply because she had had many years' opportunity to build up armaments for which she had to give no ex-

planation to the rest of the world, or, if she did give explanation, did not need to have that explanation accepted. She, in regard to her army, as in the case of England and her navy, could talk vaguely of dangers here and dangers there; could find other dangers in the hostility or preparations for hostility of other nations. She had no better explanation from them as to what they were about than did they from her. All this under such a system as outlined above would be impossible, for interference would come not at a point where the offending nation did not much care whether the hat dropped or not, but practically at the inception of the nation's intention to exploit its neighbors.

It has been claimed that limitation of armaments is unworkable because there is no means of determining what the actual military equipment of a nation is and what are its actual advances, through inventive skill, in the preparation of engines of destruction. In answer to this, it can only be stated that, with the increasing ease with which intelligence is spread abroad in these days, only by the most unusual means could engines of war of any appreciable strength be manufactured unknown to the rest of the world. Furthermore, it must be remembered that such engines of war as Germany had prepared unknown to the rest of the world were prepared only because a condition was accepted in which there were no limits to such construction, and consequently no great international curiosity as to Germany's activities in that direction. Ostensibly preparing only for defense and to preserve the peace, but on a scale which it is to be hoped must be impossible in the future, Germany was able to conceal much of its preparation in the midst of a huge military machine which was allowed by the nations to operate because they themselves had no organization through which to protest and no precedents or criteria for such protest up to the point when Germany might actually declare war. Granted armaments of which the whole world approves, and granted that the preparation of these armaments are everywhere known and understood, no nation under heaven could surreptitiously add to these sufficient engines of destruction and sufficient organization to employ them effectively to imperil any other nation. The very fact that there were indications of some such great secret undertaking on foot in any country would be sufficient reason for any neighbor nation to place its complaint before the world tribunal.

The theory of this plan of limitation of armaments is a very simple one. It is that, so long as one person or one nation knows what another intends and is satisfied as to those intentions, it need not worry, and will not worry, over what weapons that other may possess. So long as a nation's or a person's actions coincide with its declared purposes, that is sufficient. And when they seem to be no longer coincident, there should be, and in the event of an international agreement would be, means for a calm and equitable inquiry into and decision upon the matter and a consequent forestalling of any possible evil intent. In national armaments mutually acceptable to all the nations lies a hope that is impossible at present in either partial or total disarmament. Furthermore, it is not difficult to perceive that if any pathway lead to the abolishment of armaments, it is the path of frank avowal of the purpose of armaments by all nations maintaining them.

PATRIOTIC INTERNATIONALISM VS. OBSTRUCTIONISM.

By JULIA GRACE WALES

IN ORDER to promote national harmony, in order to keep sincere pacifists from being drawn into an attitude of obstructionism, in order to uphold at home and abroad the disinterested motives of our Government, and in order to conserve the spirit of world citizenship as a reconstructive force after the war, may it not be well for those individual pacifists who support the administration to emphasize the following points as they have opportunity?

1. *Constructive pacifism* as we understand it is the faith that universal permanent peace is desirable and ultimately feasible, and is worth working and striving and, if necessary, even dying for. By *peace* we mean security, freedom, harmony, and the contentment that is conditioned upon a sense of normal progress. (Because the word *pacifism* is so variously used and so often misunderstood, it might be well to give to constructive pacifism as we have defined it an alternative name: we suggest the name *patriotic internationalism*.)

2. *We believe that constructive pacifism should work for national harmony as well as international peace. Obstructionism is inconsistent with our conception of constructive pacifism. Class war is inconsistent with our conception of constructive pacifism. We believe that a hearty patriotism is an indispensable element in a vigorous internationalism.* We believe that true internationalism rests, not upon a compromise of national loyalties, but upon their union in a new synthesis large enough to fulfill and perfect the profoundly enriching experiences of national life.

3. *We believe that international altruism is the only sound self-interest for a nation. National isolation is inconsistent with our conception of patriotic world citizenship.* We believe that whatever threatens the security and freedom of one nation threatens the security and freedom of all nations.

4. While affirming our adherence to constructive pacifism as we have defined it, *we declare our unqualified support of the administration in its present constructive policy. We believe that for the United States, neutrality in April, 1917, would have been treason to internationalism.** We believe that universal permanent peace cannot be assured until there is an end of autocracy. We believe that the United States is fighting for those principles of internationalism which make for the freedom, security, and progress of all the nations of the earth. We believe that the administration is employing, not only physical methods for achieving military victory, but also moral methods for achieving moral and political victory. We believe that the Stand-

* We desire to point out that "non-resistance" (i. e. "passive resistance" or "non-coercionism") is not neutrality, but would have involved a stand utterly opposed to neutrality and an experiment of the utmost difficulty and danger, such as could be undertaken only by a nation more highly developed and trained than any nation in the world today. Hence, even in the opinion of many of "non-resisters," the theory of non-resistance does not at present enter into the problem of national policy.